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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3wfNl2L0Gf8
Foucault is unfortunately right: any time we try to enact the concept of 'ideal justice' we are led astray by the cultural assumptions we've uncritically let slide. (Unfortunately he doesn't get the time to elucidate his example of the Russian revolution and the nuclear family structure which it engendered by using state power *after* a brief period of a true freedom of social experimentation.) Even going towards a view of 'better justice' is a futile experience unless we look for the ways *why* our *current* understanding of justice is not good enough, not in the abstract/logical sense, but in a social, cultural, economic sense - in short, how and why it's been shaped by power relations.
Unfortunately, we cannot act collectively *without* some sort of a symbol of unity, and Foucalt's "right is might" "we the proletariat should take power simply because it will be better for us" is just an appeal to an anachronistic theory of justice (it might very well be that it will *not* be better for *some* people - women? people of color? well-paid intellectuals? - that "we" take power right now in a bloody revolution, so how are we gonna convince them if not with a unified ideology? here we construct an *us* in whose interests the individuals are called to action).
Foucault's skeptisim / pessimism / non-committal may seem annoying, but you should remember that it's thanks to his work that's it's become possible to critisise such power relations as gender and race in a constructive way (thanks to the work of Judith Butler who very much stands on the shoulders of Foucault for example).
For years I've been annoyed by the philosophical nullity of Chomsky's ideas in this debate and other works, he's a throwback straight to Plato. And yet it's easy to identify with his practical political position because it's born more of plain common sense than of any scientific inquiry. However Foucault rightly points out that the practical reality of 'direct action' isn't grounded in splitting hairs about the definitions of legality but instead in the necessary and effective methods available to the participants.
It's important to say however that the 'system of knowledge', the 'grid' Foucault talks about isn't actually born out of thin air to replace the old one - but presumably mutates from the contradictions inherent in the previous state of affairs? And thus it may be useful to exploit, for example, the international law by pointing out how it contradicts itself and also the actions the rich nations are allowing themselves to undertake - without fully subscribing to the ideas behind it.
Foucault is unfortunately right: any time we try to enact the concept of 'ideal justice' we are led astray by the cultural assumptions we've uncritically let slide. (Unfortunately he doesn't get the time to elucidate his example of the Russian revolution and the nuclear family structure which it engendered by using state power *after* a brief period of a true freedom of social experimentation.) Even going towards a view of 'better justice' is a futile experience unless we look for the ways *why* our *current* understanding of justice is not good enough, not in the abstract/logical sense, but in a social, cultural, economic sense - in short, how and why it's been shaped by power relations.
Unfortunately, we cannot act collectively *without* some sort of a symbol of unity, and Foucalt's "right is might" "we the proletariat should take power simply because it will be better for us" is just an appeal to an anachronistic theory of justice (it might very well be that it will *not* be better for *some* people - women? people of color? well-paid intellectuals? - that "we" take power right now in a bloody revolution, so how are we gonna convince them if not with a unified ideology? here we construct an *us* in whose interests the individuals are called to action).
Foucault's skeptisim / pessimism / non-committal may seem annoying, but you should remember that it's thanks to his work that's it's become possible to critisise such power relations as gender and race in a constructive way (thanks to the work of Judith Butler who very much stands on the shoulders of Foucault for example).
For years I've been annoyed by the philosophical nullity of Chomsky's ideas in this debate and other works, he's a throwback straight to Plato. And yet it's easy to identify with his practical political position because it's born more of plain common sense than of any scientific inquiry. However Foucault rightly points out that the practical reality of 'direct action' isn't grounded in splitting hairs about the definitions of legality but instead in the necessary and effective methods available to the participants.
It's important to say however that the 'system of knowledge', the 'grid' Foucault talks about isn't actually born out of thin air to replace the old one - but presumably mutates from the contradictions inherent in the previous state of affairs? And thus it may be useful to exploit, for example, the international law by pointing out how it contradicts itself and also the actions the rich nations are allowing themselves to undertake - without fully subscribing to the ideas behind it.